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Over the last decade, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs have become one of the 
most widely adopted anti-poverty initiatives in the developing world. Inspired particularly 
by Mexico’s successful Progresa/Oportunidades program, CCTs are viewed as an effective 
way to provide basic income support while building childrens’ human capital.  These 
programs have had a remarkable global expansion, from a handful programs in the late 
1990s to programs in close to 30 countries today, including a demonstration program in the 
United States. In contrast to many other safety net programs in developing countries, CCTs 
have been closely studied and well evaluated, creating both a strong evidence base from 
which to inform policy decisions and an active global community of practice.   
 
This paper first reviews the emergence of CCTs in the context of a key theme in welfare 
reform, notably using incentives to promote human capital development, going beyond the 
traditional focus on income support. The paper then examines what has been learned to 
date from the experience with CCTs in the South and raises a series of questions 
concerning the relevance and replicability of these lessons in other contexts.  We then turn 
to the North to look at how lessons from the South have influenced the introduction of the 
first holistic CCT program in the North, the Opportunity New York City Family Rewards 
program.  The paper concludes with a call for further knowledge sharing in two areas:  
between the North and South as the experience with welfare reform and CCTs in particular 
expands, and between behavioral science and welfare policy. 
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I.    INTRODUCTION   
 
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs are a new type of social assistance program that 
represents an innovative approach to the delivery of social services.  As their name implies, 
conditional cash transfers provide money to poor families conditional upon investments, 
most commonly in their children’s human capital.  To date, in Latin America and 
increasingly in Asia and Africa, the most common conditions involve sending children to 
school and/or bringing them to health centers on a regular basis.  The cash transfer is 
aimed at providing short-term assistance to families often in extreme poverty without the 
means to provide for adequate consumption, while the conditions provide an incentive for 
longer term human capital investments, especially among the young. These dual goals of 
poverty relief and human capital development are the core elements of traditional CCT 
programs. 
 
Thanks to their established track record in reaching the poor and incentivizing investments 
in children’s human capital, conditional cash transfers have become increasingly popular in 
the developing world and are now being adopted in the developed world in the hopes of 
replicating some of the human development impacts achieved by these programs. This 
global exchange of experiences is raising some key questions:  (1) Can the North learn 
from the South? Can the success of these programs be replicated outside the context of the 
first generation of programs?  (2) Can the South learn from the North? What lessons does 
the experience with welfare reform in the U.S. and developed countries more broadly hold 
for developing countries as their welfare systems mature? 
 
This paper examines the threshold of the global policy debate on these two questions First, 
we describe the emergence of key themes in welfare reform that have influence policies, 
notably in the North, but are gaining resonance in the South. Second, we discuss the place 
of CCTs in this welfare reform movement. Third, we examine the context in which the 
major lessons learned to date from the experience with CCTs in the South have been 
derived.  Fourth and finally, we turn to the North, outlining some ways in which the North 
has begun to learn from the South as a few select jurisdictions in the North (notably New 
York City) begin to experiment with CCTs and what the next generation of CCTs could 
learn from this experience in the North, particularly given the U.S. experience with welfare 
reform and the use of incentives as a cornerstone of safety net reform.  
 
II.    NEW THINKING ON THE ROLE OF WELFARE 
 
Traditionally, safety net transfers have been used to redistribute income and resources to 
the needy in society, helping them to overcome short-term poverty during periods of crisis, 
with little attention to impacts on long-term, structural poverty.  However, this view of 
social assistance transfers is changing.  
 
There are at least three dimension to this new approach to welfare policy which have been  
particularly salient to the emergence of CCT programs. These areas are consonant with 
welfare reform debates, particularly in Latin America where CCTs have had the most 
traction and in the US where CCTs have now been introduced.  First is the  
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acknowledgement of the clear role that safety nets play over the longer-term, particularly 
in protecting and developing human capital and in helping people build pathways out of 
poverty. Second is the growing use of behavioral incentives as part of safety net policy. 
Third is a broad, systematic push to build a strong evidence base on the performance of 
safety net programs, both as a crisis response mechanism and as part of a strategy for 
reducing structural poverty and building human capital.  Each of these dimensions is 
discussed below: 
 
Short-term relief and long-term development – no longer a tradeoff.  In the past, the use 
of transfers was seen as a trade-off between short-term equity and humanitarian objectives 
achieved through redistribution and long-term objectives of efficient economic growth.  
Transfers were further criticized for introducing incentives that led to reducing the current 
labor supply, crowding out private transfers and encouraging dependency. This view is 
now changing dramatically.  
 
Both the thinking and design of safety net policies and programs has evolved, going 
beyond the limited focus on short-term poverty alleviation and income redistribution, 
encompassing longer-term employment, economic growth and human capital development 
objectives. In short, the agenda has moved from protection to encompass promotion, and 
from relief to encompass investment (Grosh et al 2008). This maturation is underpinned by 
a renewed debate on the theoretical rationale for social protection. The renewed debate 
centers on a re-examination of the presumed trade-off between equity and efficiency, 
which is being questioned by new perspectives on the long-term social and economic costs 
of uninsured risks and unmitigated inequalities, and the potential role of safety nets in 
addressing some of those problems.  As explained by Ravallion (2003), by supporting 
minimum levels of consumption, helping credit-constrained poor people be productive 
workers, and providing incentives for long-term investments in human capital, safety nets 
have a potentially important role in compensating for the market failures that help 
perpetuate poverty, particularly in high inequality settings.  Das, Do and Ozler (2004) 
expand on this line of thinking, pointing out that conditionalities can be used to internalize 
positive externalities such as children’s education and health that would otherwise not be 
captured. 
 
The use of incentives as a partnership with the poor.  Incentives are part of a change in 
focus from assistance and social responsibility for the poor in alleviating poverty to 
dynamic support in partnership with the poor in moving out of poverty.  This change in 
focus has been supported by the growing use of incentives, particularly to encourage 
employment, effective risk management and investments in health and education that are 
seen as promising pathways out of poverty. 
 
Table 1. Views on Social Assistance 
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In the United States, the work requirements that have been introduced in many of the state-
led Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) programs as part of the restructuring 
of the flagship Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) U.S. cash transfer 
program are part of this movement, as are the tax credits for earned income among the 
poor (EITC) and recent proposals for tax credits for health care and education.  This focus 
on a ‘hand-up and not a hand-out’ has broad political appeal that crossed traditional party 
lines and is reflected in political discussions and popular debate in both the North and 
South calling for an emphasis on work, on investing in human capital, on temporary 
assistance and on co-responsibility between the state and its citizens.   
 
Incentives are also being used to help the poor address barriers to accessing available 
services.  This reflects the recognition that even when there is an adequate supply of 
available social services, households may face barriers to utilizing these services or 
applying them properly.  Research has documented that these services have often been 
underutilized by the poor because of demand-side barriers faced by households such as 
unmanageable out of pocket expenditures, high opportunity costs, difficult access, and 
poor information.  
 
Interestingly, the design of incentives in holistic CCTs and other health and education 
programs has proceeded independently of the growing scientific literature on how the 
nature, size, timing and contexts of incentives affect their impact on human behavior. We 
expect that this gap between the experimental social policy literature and the scientific 
literatures in such fields as behavioral economics (Thaler & Susstien, 2008) and 
motivational psychology (Deci & Ryan, 1985) will be closed considerably over the next 
decade, much to the intellectual benefit of both fields. 
 
Using evidence to inform policy.  In the North, the use of a strong information base to 
inform policy, including poverty targeting systems, key performance indicators and 
rigorous impact evaluations has been a cornerstone of effective public sector management 
in the social sectors (see, for example, Heckman, Lalonde and Smith, 1999, on training and 
employment programs). Additionally, many policymakers, foundations and research grants 
have engaged in program demonstrations based on randomized control designs to test the 
effectiveness of particular policy interventions (Bloom et al., 2007). In the U.S., federal 
support to local education authorities is increasingly directed to use of “evidence-based 
programs” and the Obama Administration has recently lent renewed support to this effort 
through its proposal to fund evidence-based “Investments in Innovation”.  Increasingly this 
focus on evidence-based policy is being adopted in the developing world as well.  For 
example, in Mexico, a 1993 law on social development mandated the evaluation of all 
major social programs in the country and timed the reporting on the results of the  
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evaluations with the budget process.  In Chile, the Ministry of Finance has spent over a 
decade developing a monitoring and evaluation system that uses performance indicators 
for all government programs combined with selected program evaluations, impact 
evaluations and sectoral expenditure reviews (McKay 2007). As in Mexico, the findings 
are reported publicly and sent to Congress and the results are used to inform budgetary 
allocations. Whereas these two systems are still unusual by developing country standards, 
they represent an important and growing commitment in the South to using evidence-based 
policy to inform public sector spending. 
 
III.   THE PLACE OF CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS IN WELFARE 
REFORM 
 
With their focus on both short-term financial assistance and long-term poverty reduction, 
their use of incentives for human capital accumulation and their strong commitment to 
building an evidence-based policy, conditional cash transfers are a clear program 
manifestation of the new thinking on the role and function of social assistance.   
 
The use of incentives to promote investments in children’s human capital.  The use of 
incentives for families to invest in their children’s well-being is the most distinctive and 
controversial feature of CCT programs.  These payments to families conditional upon 
schooling, health and nutrition investments in their children vault CCTs beyond the 
traditional provision of assistance as a means to improve consumption in the short-term 
because they focus on long-term investments in the next generation’s health and 
productivity.  CCTs also recognize that poverty and inequality in income are associated 
with inequality in human capital development.  CCTs are highly ambitious and seek to 
foster human capital accumulation among the young as a means to breaking the inter-
generational cycle of poverty.  Incentives provide the primary vehicle aimed at achieving 
long-term development impacts by providing the means to address market failures and 
internalize the positive externalities accrued through increased investments in health and 
education among the young.  
 
CCTs also use incentives as a vehicle for addressing demand-side factors which have been 
recognized as impediments faced by the extreme poor in accessing health and education 
services.  These barriers include lack of information on benefits, returns, availability, 
rights;  the high cost of transportation and other direct costs to using public services, such 
as school uniforms; and the opportunity costs, notably of schooling, when families depend 
on child labor incomes. 
 
However, incentive-based CCT programs have been criticized for paying people to engage 
in behavior that they should be expected to engage in without incentives.  Moreover, there 
are concerns about the sustainability of the desired behavior once payments are ended. 
Evidence from some incentive initiatives in both health and education suggest that many 
positive behavioral changes are not maintained after withdrawal of the cash incentives 
(Aber, Quint and Willner, 2008).  Researchers from various theoretical perspectives have 
tried to explain the reasons for non-maintenance of behavioral change.  But to date, there is  
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no convincing general theory that could be used to improve the durability of positive 
behavioral change.   
 
Focusing on protection and promotion.  Beyond their dual focus on transfers for relief 
and incentives for investment, several CCTs have actively promoted policies aimed at 
strengthening both the protection and promotion functions of social assistance through 
association with other programs and tailored support to beneficiaries. For example, Chile 
Solidario explicitly serves as a ‘bridging’ functions to other programs, both to address the 
specific needs of vulnerable groups, as well as to connect able bodied adults to 
employment through access to training and employment programs.  The Jamaican PATH 
CCT program introduced “Steps to Work” which has similar ambitions, echoing the 
welfare to work movement that has been at the core of welfare reform in the North, notably 
in the United States.  
 
Fostering synergies in human development.  By focusing incentives and often training on 
health, nutrition and education, most CCT programs recognize and foster the 
complementary relationships between these elements of human capital development that 
are crucial to breaking the inter-generational transmission of poverty.  This direct fostering 
of the synergies between these areas is also a recognition of the evidence concerning the 
ineffectiveness of certain human capital investments, such as education, without the 
provision of other basic inputs, such as adequate nutrition.  This synergistic approach is 
critically dependent upon the supply of available, quality health and education services – a 
precondition which is often not available, posing strong challenge to CCTs ability to 
achieve their long-term goals.  
 
Building a strong information and evidence base.  In many countries, CCTs have led the 
way in the design of well-run administrative structures for beneficiary selection, payments, 
poverty targeting and other tools of good public administration which have contributed to 
enhanced transparency and accountability. In many countries, CCT programs have been 
actively engaged in adopted these tools from other programs as well as in sharing tools 
developed in the CCT program with other government agencies, creating economies of 
scale and promoting the use of empirical data for effective management. 
 
CCTs have also been groundbreaking in terms of the importance they have paid to impact 
evaluation with credible counterfactuals, As a consequence, CCTs are now arguably the 
best evaluated development initiative in the global South. These evaluations have formed a 
cornerstone of the policy initiative and have been carefully planned well in advance with 
strong support from program staff and policymakers. These evaluations are technically 
rigorous and have already provided evidence regarding these programs’ effectiveness.  The 
provision of sound, empirically based evidence on effectiveness has facilitated the scaling 
up of CCT programs nationally, their adoption internationally, and their continuity from 
one political regime to another.   
 
As is argued above, not only do CCTs reflect much of the new thinking around welfare 
reform which has emerged in the North, as illustrated in some core features of the CCT 
model, but CCTs are pushing the boundaries of the new thinking, with their emphasis on  
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both relief and human capital development, their focus on the dynamics of poverty 
reduction and their emphasis on information and evidence as a basis for strengthening 
public sector management. 
 
IV.    WHAT HAS BEEN LEARNED TO DATE FROM THE SOUTH: 
CONTEXTUALIZING FIRST GENERATION RESULTS 
This section looks at what CCTs have accomplished in the context in which the first 
generation of CCTs emerged – mainly middle income, Latin American countries 
characterized by concentrated rural poverty, functional public sector institutions and a 
basic supply of health and education services.  A critical question explored in the next 
section is to what extent these experiences are transferable to other settings, particularly 
resource-rich environments in the North, areas where poverty is more dispersed and multi-
dimensional, and where households face diverse constraints and opportunities. 
 
There is a large and growing literature based primarily on evaluation results from the first 
generation of CCT programs, which emerged largely in Latin America and has recently 
been reviewed in Fiszbein and Schady (2009).   
 
Evaluations reveal that CCTs have been quite successful in addressing many of the 
criticisms of earlier social assistance programs in the South such as poor poverty targeting, 
disincentive effects, and limited welfare impacts. There is clear evidence of success from a 
number of programs, primarily from Mexico, Brazil, Colombia and other countries in Latin 
America, but including Cambodia and Turkey, showing that CCT programs effectively 
reach the poor and are an important source of income support, and that human 
development impacts on the use of health and education services are notable. Impacts have 
been particularly strong on school enrollment, but selected impacts have also been 
documented in children’s health and nutritional status.  In education, impacts have been 
greater in countries and among populations with lower baseline measures of enrollment 
levels and in transition grades with high dropout rates.  In general, impacts have been 
concentrated where there are greater gaps to overcome in health and nutrition and among 
poorer households. 
The results from the experience with the first generation of CCT programs are compelling, 
but they raise two key questions. First, are they replicable outside of the specific context in 
which they were first conceived?   Second, can the short-term success of  reaching the 
poor, raising their incomes, and enhancing their use of social services translate into longer-
term success in terms of learning, health status and poverty reduction?  These questions 
remain to be answered as the global experience with CCTs expands and matures. We 
briefly examine the first question, identifying salient elements of the context in which the 
first generation of programs emerged and raising questions about which elements of CCT 
programs are context specific and which elements are broadly transferable to other 
settings.  
 
The country context: extreme rural poverty in Latin America.  The first generation of 
CCT programs were introduced in Latin America, the region of the world with the highest  
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income inequality, to address a stark and many would argue manageable problem of 
extreme poverty, given levels of income per capita, high Gini coefficients on income 
inequality and limited existing mechanisms for redistribution. At scale, in several 
countries, CCTs have become one of the primary vehicles for providing social transfers to 
the extreme poor. In Brazil, the country with the largest CCT program and one of the 
highest levels of income inequality in the world, Bolsa Familia is estimated to have 
accounted for almost a quarter of recent reductions in inequality.  
 
Though changing rapidly, Latin America’s extreme poverty remains concentrated in rural 
areas. CCTs have to date been largely rural programs, introducing a social safety net 
among populations with little or no access to any other kind of social assistance program. 
Only recently have Mexico and Colombia, among a handful of other countries, begun to 
introduce CCTs in urban areas. 
 
Families living in extreme poverty, commonly understood as those with consumption 
levels insufficient to meet basic caloric requirements have been strongly and successfully 
prioritized by CCT programs. Compared to other programs in the countries where they 
have been implemented, CCTs are among the better targeted social assistance programs 
and have been reasonably effective mechanisms for income support, providing transfers 
valued at approximately 10-20% of pre-transfer consumption levels –slightly less than 
transfer values in developed countries (Grosh et al 2008). These transfers have not only 
reduced income poverty, but allowed poor families, notably extremely poor families, to 
change their consumption patterns – results from Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Nicaragua 
point to higher consumption and better diets among beneficiary families.  
 
The institutional context: a capable civil service. The middle income countries in which 
CCTs were first introduced are characterized by reasonable public sector operational 
capacity, a relatively strong and technocratically oriented civil service bureaucracy, and a 
network of institutions at the level of central and local government that was capable of 
successfully implementing an administratively demanding program of CCTs. Under their 
current, common design, even the basic functions of a CCT program require a series of 
administratively complex activities, from accurate beneficiary identification and registry, 
to effective communications campaigns regarding program goals and rules, to strong 
monitoring capacity to verify conditionalities, to effective financial services for 
transferring money to beneficiaries on a predictable, timely basis. 
 
Beyond these basic operational functions, the specific institutions engaged in the design 
and implementation of CCTs in the first generation of countries also benefitted from their 
capacity to prioritize the use of some good practices in public sector administration. These 
practices include implementing tools for fraud and error control, engaging and 
coordinating across state agencies and between central and local levels, introducing strong 
monitoring and evaluation systems, contracting the private sector for core functions they 
were best suited to perform notably with respect to the transfer of cash to beneficiaries, and 
engaging civil society to enhance the programs’ effectiveness and accountability.  The 
successful design and implementation of these practices is at the heart of CCTs strong 
track record in targeting and effectively managing an administratively complex program.  
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Though many of these practices are not intrinsic to the CCT model, they are hallmarks of 
good public sector administration and have indeed served a demonstration effect for other 
programs in countries where CCTs have been implemented. 
 
More recently, CCTs have become a cornerstone in national poverty alleviation and 
welfare reform in several countries. Mexico’s CCT program reaches close to 25 percent of 
the Mexican population. In Brazil and Jamaica, CCTs have replaced a series of income 
transfer programs, while improving targeting and cost-effectiveness. In Colombia, the CCT 
program was introduced as a pillar in a safety net strategy designed to respond to the worst 
recession in close to 70 years and has evolved as a mainstay in a renewed approach to 
safety nets.  
The service provision context: available schools and health centers.  In the countries 
where CCTs have been introduced, there has by necessity been an available supply of 
schools and health centers which beneficiaries could use to fulfill the requirements of the 
program. Though a share of the rural poor still reside a considerable distance from schools 
and health centers, gains in access to these services over the past generation are among the 
main achievements in many of the developing countries that first introduced CCT 
programs, and CCT programs served as a natural complement for addressing demand side 
barriers faced by households to access these available services. However, there are many 
questions currently being raised about the quality of these services, particularly in light of 
the absence of any impact on achievement test scores from evaluations in Ecuador, Mexico 
and Cambodia. 
 
What does this experience suggest regarding the further expansion of CCT 
programs?   
The experience with the rapid introduction of conditional cash transfer programs in Latin 
America and Caribbean presents several questions regarding the reform of social assistance 
and the introduction of social experiments based on the use of incentives more generally in 
both the North and South.  
First, what accounts for the substantial reform in the delivery of social services 
within a short period of time under different country circumstances? In just a few years, 
CCT programs have grown and multiplied rapidly, from a handful of programs in the late 
1990’s to close to 30 programs globally today. Furthermore, within their own countries, 
many programs have been scaled up from pilots to national programs, some at the center of 
countries’ poverty reduction and social assistance strategies. What accounts for this rapid 
expansion?  Anecdotal evidence suggests that it has been fueled by CCTs’ compelling 
design features, their promising evaluation results and the emphasis on knowledge sharing 
within the CCT and welfare reform community.  This experience provides an example of 
the speed with which innovation can be adopted and scaled up, following a dynamic 
demonstration effect, with a solid grounding in evidence.  
Second, how important is the use of incentives—beyond just the transfer of 
cash—to achieving desired outcomes? Some non-experimental evidence suggests 
incentives may be quite important, but it would be valuable to more rigorously evaluate  
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this hypothesis.  Conditional transfers are clearly useful when there are both immediate 
consumption needs combined with constraints faced by poor households with young 
families to using available, high quality health and education services. It is not clear that 
this situation is always the one encountered, for example, among populations with high 
levels of school enrollments. Indeed, striking a balance between the short-term poverty 
alleviation objectives and the long-term human capital accumulation objectives presents 
policy challenges.  De Janvry and Sadoulet (2003) argue that Oportunidades’ long-term 
human capital accumulation objective is of pre-eminent importance and would be best met 
by changing the program’s targeting strategy to focus it directly on the population most at 
risk for being out of school. In a review of education-focused conditional cash transfer 
programs, Morley and Coady (2003) use data from the Nicaraguan and Mexican CCT 
programs to estimate the short-run poverty effects as well as the long-run effects of 
investing in human capital accumulation based on estimations of the future earnings of 
beneficiaries.  They conclude that for every dollar received by the poor as a transfer, the 
present value of future earnings go up by 1.52 in Mexico and 1.13 in Nicaragua, implying 
that the benefit from the investment component is of greater value than the transfer 
component. Bourguignon, Ferreira and Leite (2002) reach a similar conclusion pointing to 
the relatively greater poverty alleviation benefits of the conditionalities, as compared to the 
benefits of the transfer alone, in their ex-ante simulation of the benefits of Brazil’s Bolsa 
Escola program. In Mexico, an ex-ante simulation doubling the size of the transfer doubles 
the estimated effect on years of schooling completed. Finally, in Ecuador evaluators 
exploited quirks in program administration which resulted in the fact that conditions 
attached to transfers were publicized, but not implemented. As a result, some households 
believe that transfers are conditional, others believe they are unconditional.  Enrollment 
response among “conditioned” households is 3-4 times as large as among unconditioned 
households (Fiszbein and Schady 2009).   
 
Several CCT evaluations today are explicitly testing the use of conditionalities 
versus unconditional transfers which will yield important evidence on this key question. 
Some recent evidence coming out of Malawi shows similar impacts on health and 
schooling outcomes between girls who received conditional cash transfers and those 
receiving unconditional cash transfers of the same monetary value (Baird, McIntosh and 
Ozler 2010). As the evidence base expands, it would also be worthwhile to test how 
incentives are applied, not merely the presence of absence of incentives.  In particular, 
there are both theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that how the purpose and 
structure of the incentives are framed to recipients could have very significant influence on 
both the take-up rates of the incentives as well as their impact on “final outcomes”.  
 
Third, are the measured achievements among CCT programs to date due to 
policy, program design or the context in which CCTs have been implemented? The 
evaluation evidence provides little insight into the black box of why these results have been 
achieved and there has been little experimentation with program design, as outlined above, 
or qualitative work or institutional analysis conducted as a complement to the impact 
evaluation work. There is no doubt that the use of incentives has been important at least 
politically to convince policymakers that these programs were not a ‘hand out’ but a ‘hand 
up’ based on mutual obligations between the state and its citizens.  Further as argued  
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above, early evidence suggests that in at least certain cases, the use of incentives has 
produced results above and beyond what would have been expected from the transfers 
alone.  Others have argued that much of the success of CCT programs is not intrinsic to the 
program model, but instead attributable to sound technical design and creative innovations 
that could easily be incorporated into other programs.  Indeed policymakers today are 
considering how to use the positive experiences gleaned from CCTs’ commitment to 
poverty targeting, robust impact evaluation results, and financial efficiency as a platform 
for implementing reforms in other programs and sectors. Finally, as argued earlier, context 
and scope must also be considered, recognizing that positive evaluation results from a 
handful of programs does not imply that these experiences can be replicated under 
different circumstances. Unbundling these questions provides a rich and compelling policy 
and research agenda for the next generation of programs. 
Finally, what are the complements to CCT programs that are needed to fulfill the 
ambitious goals of breaking inter-generational cycles of poverty?  Although CCTs have 
met with measured success in terms of raising income poverty and enhancing access to 
basic health and education services, the results are less robust in terms of their impact on 
changing health and education outcomes, including learning achievement and health status. 
It is clear that CCTs need to be calibrated within an effective safety net and in coordination 
with available, high quality supply side investments. These programs cannot function in 
isolation from the provision of quality health and education services which is often a 
pressing need in the countries where CCTs are being implemented. To put it starkly, there 
is no compelling reason in getting children to schools and health centers if teachers and 
health workers are ineffective or absent. The introduction of CCTs has not resolved 
longstanding issues of quality, efficiency and effectiveness within social sector ministries, 
across the myriad of often uncoordinated social assistance providers, and in often outdated 
and financially insolvent social insurance programs.  
It will be important to see whether the ambitious forays into coordination with 
complementary programs being pursued in Chile, Jamaica, Colombia and New York City 
just to name a few programs, will succeed. Can CCT programs can be effective in 
addressing problems beyond those they have been designed to take on, notably labor 
market issues?  Are there effective strategies for ensuring adequate coordination between 
and across programs?  Again there will be much to learn from this new generation of 
efforts.   
V.    WHAT CAN NORTH LEARN FROM SOUTH?  
 
To this point in the paper, we have endeavored to describe the emergence of the CCT 
movement, place it in the context of global trends in welfare reform, and highlighted what 
has been learned from the last decade of work in the South.  In this section, we turn to the 
question of what the North can learn from the South as they begin to consider how to adopt 
and test holistic CCT strategies. 
 
While countries of the global North have some experience in developing incentive-
based initiatives to change behaviors that promote health and education (Aber et al, 2008), 
they are just beginning to experiment with “holistic” potentially synergistic CCTs with key  
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features of the Southern model.  The first jurisdiction in the North to take up the challenge 
of designing, implementing and rigorously evaluating a holistic CCT was New York City.  
Other jurisdictions in the U.S. (the cities of Chicago, Illinois, and Savannah, Georgia, and 
the State of California) and Europe (the national government of the U.K.) have actively 
considered developing CCTs to their specific conditions. 
 
What considerations were behind New York City’s to introduce a CCT program?   
 
A number of factors were behind New York City’s decision to implement a CCT program, 
including: 
 
An interest in using incentives to promote desired behavioral changes. Policymakers 
in NYC felt that government should take cash incentives seriously as a potential change 
strategy and draw on the growing science of behavioral incentive designs (in fields like 
behavioral economics and motivational psychology) to fashion more effective antipoverty 
and human capital development initiatives.  This use of incentives in a CCT program 
would help government extend the concept of “co-responsibilities” from the work/welfare 
domain dominant in the U.S. to the parent/family support domain. 
 
A recognition of the multidimensional nature of poverty and the important synergies 
in human development.  It is possible, and may be desirable, to move beyond incentive-
based initiatives designed to promote better outcomes in a single domain (e.g. education or 
health or employment) to initiatives that are more holistic in design and potentially 
synergistic in impact.  (The proof of how desirable it will be awaits the final results of a 
rigorous evaluation.).  In parallel, there was an interest in designing strategies that 
challenge the seemingly intractable tradeoffs of short-term poverty reduction and 
intermediate term human capital development that would allow for NYC to do something 
bold, dramatic, and impactful in poverty reduction and human capital development. 
 
    A focus on adaptation and evaluation.  New CCTs are best designed with knowledge of 
the successes and failures of past initiatives and with great emphasis placed on making 
important adaptations in response to the new context.  Such initiatives can be designed, 
implemented and rigorously evaluated in a manner that generates substantial support 
across a broad political spectrum. 
 
New York City’s Opportunity NYC Program 
 
With these and other lessons gleaned from the published literature, learning networks, 
consultation with policymakers, practitioners and researchers from the South and 
deliberations with colleagues both within New York City and the U.S., New York 
fashioned its own pilot CCT.  Called “Opportunity NYC:  Family Rewards” (Aber, 2009).  
 
Like Progresa and many CCT programs developed in the South, Opportunity NYC: 
Family Rewards provides big, new cash transfers to eligible families (up to $6,000 a year if 
families fully meet all conditions), but conditions the funding on parents’ investments in 
their children’s (and their own) human capital.  While the goals of Opportunity NYC:  
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Family Rewards resemble models implemented in the South, several of the details are 
different in important ways. 
 
1.  It is based on not two, but three sets of conditions: family health, child education, 
and adult work/education. 
2.  The model has a menu of incentives linked to payments so that New York City 
families become eligible for part of the transfers as each condition is met, whereas 
in developing countries there are typically only two types of transfers – a family 
transfer linked to health and investments nutrition and a per-child transfer like to 
educational attendance. 
3.  Rather than creating conditions based exclusively on behavioral effort (getting to 
clinic, attending school), NYC added conditions based on children’s performance, 
especially educational performance on academic achievement tests. 
4.  Perhaps most importantly, the CCT program was designed not as a substitute for 
existing social assistance programs, but as a complement. 
 
In each of these ways, the NYC initiative anticipates the continued evolution in CCTs 
internationally.  Conditions to promote adult human capital development (education and 
employment training) and transition to full-time employment, conditions rewarding 
performance and the most effective interactions between CCTs and other social programs 
are at the forefront of continued international development. 
 
In order to rigorously evaluate the impact of Opportunity NYC, MDRC designed and 
conducted a random assignment evaluation of approximately 4,800 families and 11,000 
children in six very low-income communities, half of whom received cash incentives if 
they met required conditions and half who were assigned to a control group that could not 
receive the incentives.  In a recent report covering the first 12-to-24 months of program 
operation, Riccio et al. (2010) found that despite a number of challenges to start up, nearly 
all families earned rewards that averaged $6,000 over the first two years.  They also found 
numerous positive effects across a broad range of economic and health outcomes (reduced 
poverty and hardship, increased savings and use of bank accounts, reduced reliance on 
hospital ER’s and increased receipt of Medicaid and dental care).  But there were few 
positive effects on education and employment outcomes.  The authors emphasize that 
because these early findings cover the rocky start-up phase of the experiment, it is too soon 
to draw definitive conclusions about NYC’s effort to adopt and implement a CCT in a 
services-rich jurisdiction in the North like New York City. 
 
Upon completion of the evaluation of Opportunity NYC, the North may be in a position to 
begin to share lessons with the larger CCT community of the South.   
 
1.  Opportunity NYC will provide evidence of whether conditioning a large new 
supplement, over and above the basic social transfers, can yield significant impacts 
on poverty and human outcomes.   
2.  Because it is implemented in a high-income, program rich urban area, Opportunity 
NYC will provide insight for how to adapt CCTs in these types of urban settings 
where modifications in beneficiary targeting, incentives structures and coordination  
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with other types of programs will likely need to be altered from the traditional rural 
model. 
3.  Because of the nature of the evaluation design, it will also help begin to open up the 
“black box” of CCTs by specifying and measuring intermediate processes that 
could help explain the impact of CCTs on children’s human capital development. 
4.  In the U.S., a strong critique has been mounted by some researchers and 
policymakers on the use of cash incentives to motivate change in children’s 
education-directed behaviors and outcomes.  Specifically, Deci and others have 
argued that providing children external rewards for learning will, over time reduce 
their intrinsic motivation for learning.  This theory might help explain why some 
CCTs showed improvement in children’s school attendance but not their academic 
performance.  Because a sub-study of the Opportunity NYC evaluation will include 
measures of change in children’s intrinsic and extrinsic motivations for academic 
effort, it will be able to address this issue. 
5.  Throughout the global CCT community, the question of how CCTs might be used 
to promote transitions to employment and economic self-sufficiency is of 
increasing interest to policymakers.  Opportunity NYC’s efforts to use incentives to 
promote full-time work and/or education/training may prove useful to workers in 
the South. 
6.  Finally, it is likely that policymakers in the North will push CCT program 
designers to target (and researchers to evaluate) changes in what Fiszbein and 
Schady (2008) refer to as “final” human development outcomes.  In the North, 
increasing school attendance and clinic visits are likely to be seen as more means to 
ends.  The most valued impact will be on human capital development outcomes 
(such as learning, and behavioral health) that forecast greater earnings and eventual 
escape from intergenerational poverty in adulthood. 
 
The first experiments on CCTs in the North increase the likelihood of true North/South 
dialogue on optimal program designs and evaluation strategies. CCTs are one of the few 
examples of Northern governments seizing on creative policy developments in the South 
and struggling to adapt them to their relatively services- and benefits-rich contexts.  While 
we have only begun to scratch the surface of what the South and North could learn from 
each other about CCTs, our preliminary conclusion is that there will be much reciprocal 
learning that will occur over the next decade of development in the field. 
 
To ensure the continued generation of knowledge on effective strategies for combating 
poverty, it is critical to continue to use impact evaluations strategically.  The use of 
experimental and robust quasi-experimental designs in CCT programs around the world 
has been a hallmark of the programs which has helped ensure a strong evidence base for 
policy decisions.  As CCTs continue to be introduced, particularly in settings distinct from 
the rural areas of high-inequality middle-income countries where CCTs have been 
concentrated, it will be important to uphold this tradition of using place randomized trials 
and other robust evaluation methods to test the effectiveness of CCTs in various settings.  
In the future, it would also be useful to go beyond rigorously evaluating the effectiveness 
of a given program on welfare outcomes, but to test various alternatives to achieving a 
priority outcome.    
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VI.   A FORWARD LOOKING PERSPECTIVE ON USING INCENTIVES IN 
SOCIAL POLICY 
 
At their core, holistic CCTs endeavor to influence the economic decision making and 
behavior of poor adults by providing incentives.  In the early CCTs in Latin America, the 
incentives were designed to increase parents’ investments in their children’s human capital.  
Concretely, this meant incentives to increase take-up of health (e.g. well-baby visits, 
nutritional programs) and education (e.g. school enrollment and attendance) programs. 
 
To date, the economic decision making and behavior of the poor have been considered 
from several perspectives in the social and behavioral sciences, notably behavioral 
economics (the combination of selected features of cognitive and decision sciences with 
classical economics), psychology more broadly (including cognitive, motivational, social 
and developmental psychology) and sociology.  Unfortunately, both the design and the 
rigorous empirical evaluation of holistic CCTs have proceeded without sufficient attention 
to relevant advances in the social and behavioral sciences. 
 
Over the next decade, this gap between CCTs as applied public policy and theory and 
research in the social and behavioral sciences can and should be closed.  The potential 
promise of closing this gap has begun to be illustrated by a small community of creative 
researchers and practitioners who are working across traditional disciplinary boundaries in 
psychology, behavioral economics and public policy more generally (Amir et al., 2005) 
and behavioral and marketing strategies to aid decision making among the poor, more 
specifically (Bertrand, Mullainathan & Shafir, 2006).  As Duflo and colleagues (2005) 
argue, “an important task for future empirical work (on incentives) is to go beyond merely 
estimating the size of the behavioral responses (to particular incentives) in specific 
contexts and start exploring the factors that shape the size of the behavioral response”. 
 
A growing body of research suggests the importance of such decisions as: 
(1) introducing CCTs via small discussion groups rather than via individual interviews, 
(2) reducing cognitive load and improving information processing regarding 
incentives, 
(3) “priming the right identities” in introducing CCTs to poor individuals and sub-
communities, 
(4) reducing the danger of killing intrinsic motivation by framing CCTs in an 
autonomy-promoting manner, and  
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We are not arguing that CCTs should immediately adopt these specific design features.  
Rather, we are arguing that systematically researching these types of factors that appear to 
shape the size of behavioral responses to social programs like CCTs merits deeper 
investigation and experimentation in the development of more successful holistic CCTs. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION   
We began this paper by describing how social assistance policies are undergoing rapid 
change in many parts of the world.  In the 1990’s, the emergence of CCTs in Latin 
America converged with welfare reform initiatives in the United States and the United 
Kingdom.   While the evolution of social assistance policies and practices are rooted in 
countries’ and regions’ specific historical, social-economic, political and cultural contexts, 
we argue nonetheless that core elements of reform appear to be converging.  The more 
traditional view of social assistance (transfers as a handout in times of need to alleviate 
poverty) has begun to evolve into a new view of social assistance as a dynamic where 
protection is complemented by dynamic, tailored support to develop the human capital 
needed to move out of poverty. The use of incentives to affect individual investments, spur 
effective practices among providers, and leverage mobility out of poverty are increasingly 
being applied within this new paradigm. Yet participants in this debate are quick to point 
out potential problems associated with incentives, particularly if they substitute for 
individual initiative and intrinsic motivation. 
 
It is our judgment that this convergence of core elements of social assistance reform has 
increased both interest in and the practical utility of more extensive and intensive 
knowledge sharing across countries and regions.  Such knowledge sharing was quite 
evident between countries within Latin America and between States in the U.S.  Broader 
North/South knowledge exchange has been slower to develop, but over the last few years, 
the North/South gap has begun to be bridged.  One clear example is the unprecedented 
influence of the Progressa/Opportunidades initiative in Mexico on the development of 
Opportunity NYC/Family Rewards in New York City. 
 
Such exchanges work best when they are not one way streets.  Indeed, Mexico was eager 
to consult with New York City in part because it had yet to embark on adapting the theory 
and practice of CCTs to urban, relatively services-rich jurisdictions.  And such exchanges 
are valuable as bilateral initiatives, but perhaps can be more efficient and more influential 
if they are more multilateral in design and execution.  The World Bank, the United 
Nations, the Inter-American Development Bank and other multilateral development 
institutions have also been actively engaged in the promotion of multilateral exchange 
                                                 
3 see Bertrand et al., 2006, for a fuller discussion of the emerging research which suggest 
that each of these strategies increases the probability that CCTs will positively influence 
the economic decision making of the poor. 
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across CCT practitioners, including through international conferences, teleconferenced 
learning networks, websites and publications.  
 
More recently, the Rockefeller Foundation set up a learning network among policymaking, 
program developers and researchers from a small number of countries who were at the 
early stages of developing and implementing CCTs and several countries with more 
extensive experience. Additionally in the Fall of 2009, the Organization of American 
States (OAS) announced a major new North/South initiative in Social Assistance in the 
Americas.  The Secretary General of OAS was joined by President Michelle Bachelet of 
Chile and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton from the U.S. to announce the initiative.  This 
multilateral agreement and public launch of the Inter-American Social Protection Network 
have included follow-up meetings to work out the technical details needed to create a new 
cross-national network of demonstration and shared learning. 
 
Paradoxically, the current global recession has created both an urgent need for the 
expansion and reform of social assistance policies, as well as a set of fiscal challenges to 
mounting new initiatives.  For these reasons, it is an excellent time to take North/South 
knowledge sharing on social assistance, especially on policies aimed at protecting the poor 
and promoting human capital development, to the next level. 
 
Finally, besides the North/South gap, another gap needs to be bridged in this next phase of 
development of social assistance policies, the gap between basic research in key areas of 
the social and behavioral sciences (e.g. behavioral economics, motivational psychology, 
social network analysis) and the design and evaluation of CCT initiatives.  The good news 
is that rigorous evaluations of CCTs have paid great dividends in learning what works and 
what doesn’t and in facilitating the scale-up and sustainability of more effective and 
efficient social assistance policies.   But it is striking to us how divorced the design, 
implementation and evaluation of CCTs have been from significant advances in scientific 
knowledge about how variation in the timing, nature and contingencies of incentives affect 
their impact, about  how such impact may vary by context and about how the “framing” of 
incentives affects their influence.  A robust research agenda should become a critical 





Aber, J.L.  2009.  Experiments in 21
st century antipoverty policy. Public Policy Review 16 
(1), 57-63. 
Adato, Michelle. 2000. “The Impact of PROGRESA on Community Social Relationships.” 
September. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C.  
Adato, Michelle, B. de la Brière, D. Mindek, and A. Quisumbing. 2000. “Final Report: The 
Impact of PROGRESA on Women's Status and Intrahousehold Relations.” July. 
International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C. 
Amir, O., Ariely, D., Cooke, A., Dunning, D., Epley, N., Koszegi, B., Lichtenstein, D., 
Mazar, N., Mullainathan, S., Prelec, D., Shafir, E., and Silva, J. 2005. Psychology, 
Behavioral Economics, and Public Policy, Marketing Letters, 16 (3-4), p. 443-454. 
Ayala Consulting. 2003. “Workshop on Conditional Cash Transfer Programs:  Operational 
Experiences.” World Bank Social Protection Network. Washington, D.C. 
Baird, Sarah, Craig McIntosh and Berk Ozler. 2010. “Cash or Condition? Evidence from a 
Randomized Cash Transfer Program” Processed. World Bank Development 
Research Group. Washington, DC. 
Behrman, Jere and John Hoddinott. 2000. “An Evaluation of the Impact of PROGRESA on 
Pre-school Child Height”. International Food Policy Research Institute. 
Washington, DC.  
Behrman, Jere, P. Sengupta, and P. Todd. 2001. “Progressing through PROGRESA: An 
Impact Assessment of a School Subsidy Experiment.” April. University of 
Pennsylvania and the International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, 
DC. 
Bertrand, M., Mullainathan, S., & Shafir, E. 2006. Behavioral Economics and Marketing in 
Aid of Decision-Making among the Poor. Journal of Public Policy and Marketing, 
25, 1, 8-23. 
Bourguignon, Francois, Francisco H.G. Ferreira, and Phillippe G. Leite. 2002. Ex-Ante 
Evaluation of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs. The Case of Bolsa Escola.” 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2916.  Washington, DC. 
Coady, David. 2000. “The Application of Social Cost-benefit Analysis to the Evaluation of 
PROGRESA.” December. International Food Policy Research Institute, 
Washington, D.C.  
Coady, David. and R. Harris. 2000. “A General Equilibrium Analysis of the Welfare 
Impact of PROGRESA.” April. International Food Policy Research Institute, 
Washington, D.C.  
Coady, David, Margaret Grosh and Johh Hoddinott. 2003. “Targeting Outcomes Redux”. 
FCND Discussion Paper #144, International Food Policy Research Institute, 
Washington, D.C.  
Coady, David and Samuel Morley. 2003. From Social Assistance to Social Development: 
Targeted Education Subsidies in Developing Countries. Center for Global Development, 
Washington, DC 
DeJanvry, Alain and Elizabeth Sadoulet. 2003.  “Analysis of the CONTIGO Strategy with 
Emphasis on Local and Rural Development”. Processed. World Bank, Latin 
America and Caribean Region, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management 
Unit, Washington, DC.  
  20
Das, Jishnu, Quy-Toan Do and Berk Ozler. 2004. “Conditional Cash Transfers and the 
Equity-Efficiency Debate.” Processed. World Bank, Development Research Group, 
Washington, DC. 
Deci, E. L., and R.M. Ryan. 1985. Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human 
behavior. New York: Plenum. 
Duflo, Esther, William Gale, Jeffrey Liebman, Peter Orszag, and Emmanuel Saez, “Saving 
Incentives for Low- and Middle-Income Families: Evidence from a Field 
Experiment with H&R Block,” NBER Working Paper No. 11680, October 2005. 
Fiszbein Ariel and Norbert Schady. 2009. "Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing  Present 
and Future Poverty", Policy Research Report, The World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Gertler, Paul J. 2000. “Final Report: The Impact of PROGRESA on Health”. International 
Food Policy Research Institute. Washington, DC 
Grosh, Margaret. 1994. Administering Targeted Social Programs in Latin America: from 
Platitudes to Practice. World Bank Regional and Sectoral Studies Series, 
Washington, DC.  
Grosh, Margaret, Carlo del Ninno, Emil Tesliuc, and Azedine Ouerghi. 2008.For 
Protection and Promotion: The Design and Implementation of Effective Safety 
Nets. The World Bank. Washington DC. 
Grossman, Jean. 1994. “Evaluating Social Policies: Principles and U.S. Experience” World 
Bank Research Observer 9(2): 159-180. 
Heckman, James, Robert Lalonde and Jeffrey Smith. 1999. “The Economics and 
Econometrics of Active Labor Market Programs.”  Handbook of Labor Economics, 
Volume 3, Part 1.  
Hoddinott, J., E. Skoufias, and R. Washburn. 2000. “The Impact of PROGRESA on 
Consumption: A Final Report. September.” International Food Policy Research 
Institute, Washington, DC. 
Institute for Fiscal Studies, Econometria and SEI. 2003.“Informe Linea de Base-Familias 
en Accion”.  Processed, Bogota, Colombia. 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). 2000a. “Second Report: 
Implementation Proposal for the PRAF/IDB Project – Phase II” processed 
----------. 2000b. “Third Report: Monitoring and Evaluation System PRAF” processed 
----------. 2001a. “Informe: Sistema de Evaluación de la Fase Piloto de la Red de 
Protección Social de Nicaragua.” processed  
----------. 2001b. “Sistema de Evaluación de la Fase Piloto de la Red de Protección Social 
de Nicaragua: Línea de Base 2000.” processed 
----------. 2002a. “Informe Final - Sistema de Evaluación de la Fase Piloto de la Red de 
Protección Social de Nicaragua: Evaluación de Impacto.” processed 
----------. 2002b. “Informe Final - Sistema de Evaluación de la Fase Piloto de la Red de 
Protección Social de Nicaragua: Evaluación de Focalización.” processed 
Legovini, Arianna, and Ferdinando Regalia. 2001. “Targeted Human Development 
Programs: Investing in the Next Generation.” Inter-American Development Bank, 
Sustainable Development Department, Poverty and Inequality Advisory Unit. 
Washington, DC. 
Maluccio, John A. Forthcoming. "Education and Child Labor: Experimental Evidence 
from a Nicaraguan Conditional Cash Transfer Program" in Child Labor in Latin  
  21
America,  P. Orazem, G. Sedlaceck, and Z. Tzannatos, editors. International Food 
Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C. processed. 
Marques, Jose. 2003. “A Review of Social Safety Net Assessments for Central America”. 
World Bank Human Development Group, Latin America and Caribbean region. 
Washington, DC. Processed. 
Morley, Samuel and David Coady.  2003. “From Social Assistance to Social Development: 
A Review of Targeted Education Subsidies in Developing Countries.”  February. 
International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C.  
Parker, S., and E. Skoufias. 2000. “Final Report: The Impact of PROGRESA on Work, 
Leisure, and Time Allocation.” October. International Food Policy Research 
Institute, Washington, D.C. 
Riccio, J., Dechausay, N., Greenberg, D., Miller C., Rucks, Z., & Verma, N. (2010).  
Toward Reduced Poverty Across Generations: Early Findings from New York 
City’s Conditional Cash Transfer Program.  New York: MDRC.   
http://www.mdrc.org/publications/549/full.pdf 
Rossi, Peter H., Howard E. Freeman, and Mark W. Lipsey. 1999. Evaluation: A Systematic 
Approach. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA 
Ravallion, Martin. 2003. “Targeted Transfers in Poor Countries: Revisiting the Trade-offs 
and Policy Options.”  World Bank, Development Economics Research Group, 
Washington, DC, processed.  
Rawlings, Laura and Gloria Rubio. 2004.  “Evaluating the Impact of Conditional Cash 
Transfer Programs.” Forthcoming, World Bank Research Observer, Washington, 
DC. 
Schultz, T. Paul. 2000a. “Impact of Progresa on School Attendance Rates in the Sampled 
Population” International Food Policy Research Institute: Washington, D.C. 
Schultz, T. P. 2000b. “School Subsidies for the Poor: Evaluating a Mexican Strategy for 
Reducing Poverty.” June. International Food Policy Research Institute, 
Washington, D.C.  
Schultz, T. P. 2000c. “Final Report: The Impact of PROGRESA on School Enrollments.” 
April. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C.  
Schultz, T. P. 2001. “School Subsidies for the Poor: Evaluating the Mexican PROGRESA 
Poverty Program.” August. Yale University Economic Growth Center, New Haven, 
CT.  
Sedlacek, Guilherme, Nadeem Ilahi and Emily Gustafsson-Wright. 2000. “Targeted 
Conditional Transfers Programs in Latin America: An Early Survey”, The World 
Bank: Washington, D.C. 
Skoufias, E. 2001. “PROGRESA and its Impacts on the Human Capital and Welfare of 
Households in Rural Mexico: A Synthesis of the Results of an Evaluation by 
IFPRI.” December. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C.  
Skoufias, E., B. Davis, and J. Behrman. 1999. “Final Report: An Evaluation of the 
Selection of Beneficiary Households in the Education, Health, and Nutrition 
Program (PROGRESA) of Mexico.” International Food Policy Research Institute: 
Washington, D.C. 
Skoufias, E., B. Davis, and S. de la Vega. 1999. “An Addendum to the Final Report: An 
Evaluation of the Selection of Beneficiary Households in the Education, Health, 
and Nutrition Program (PROGRESA) of Mexico. Targeting the Poor in Mexico:  
  22
Evaluation of the Selection of Beneficiary Households into PROGRESA.” 
December. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C.  
Skoufias, Emmanuel, and Bonnie McClafferty. 2001. “Is Progresa Working? Summary of 
the Results of an Evaluation by IFPRI” International Food Policy Research 
Institute: Washington, D.C. 
Teruel, G., and B. Davis. 2000. “Final Report: An Evaluation of the Impact of 
PROGRESA Cash Payments on Private Inter-Household Transfers.” August. 
International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C.  
Yap, Yoon-Tien, Guilherme Sedlacek and Peter Orazem. 2001. “Limiting Child Labor 
Through Bahavior-Based Income Transfers: An Experimental Evaluation of the 
PETI Program in Rural Brazil”. World Bank, Washington, DC 
World Bank. 2001a. Brazil: An Assessment of the Bolsa Escola Programs. Human 
Development Department, Latin America and Caribbean Region, The World Bank, 
Washington, DC. 
World Bank. 2001b. Poverty Reduction and the World Bank: Progress in Fiscal 2000 and 
2001. The World Bank, Washington, DC. 
 Social Protection Discussion Paper Series Titles 
 
No.   Title 
 
1101  North-South Knowledge Sharing on Incentive-based Conditional Cash Transfer 
Programs 
  by Lawrence Aber and Laura B. Rawlings, January 2011 
 
1008  Social Policy, Perceptions and the Press: An Analysis of the Media’s Treatment 
of Conditional Cash Transfers in Brazil 
  by Kathy Lindert and Vanina Vincensini, December 2010 (online only) 
 
1007  Bringing Financial Literacy and Education to Low and Middle Income 
Countries: The Need to Review, Adjust, and Extend Current Wisdom 
  by Robert Holzmann, July 2010 (online only) 
 
1006  Key Characteristics of Employment Regulation in the Middle East and North 
Africa 
  by Diego F. Angel-Urdinola and Arvo Kuddo with support from Kimie Tanabe 
and May Wazzan, July 2010 (online only) 
 
1005  Non-Public Provision of Active Labor Market Programs in Arab-Mediterranean 
Countries: An Inventory of Youth Programs 
  by Diego F. Angel-Urdinola, Amina Semlali and Stefanie Brodmann, July 2010 
(online only) 
 
1004  The Investment in Job Training: Why Are SMEs Lagging So Much Behind? 
  by Rita K. Almeida and Reyes Aterido, May 2010 (online only) 
 
1003  Disability and International Cooperation and Development: A Review of Policies 
and Practices 
  by Janet Lord, Aleksandra Posarac, Marco Nicoli, Karen Peffley, Charlotte 
McClain-Nhlapo and Mary Keogh, May 2010  
 
1002  Toolkit on Tackling Error, Fraud and Corruption in Social Protection Programs 
  by Christian van Stolk and Emil D. Tesliuc, March 2010 (online only) 
 
1001  Labor Market Policy Research for Developing Countries: Recent Examples from 
the Literature - What do We Know and What should We Know? 
by Maria Laura Sanchez Puerta, January 2010 (online only) 
 
0931  The Korean Case Study: Past Experience and New Trends in Training Policies 
  by Young-Sun Ra and Kyung Woo Shim, December 2009 (online only) 
 
 
 0930  Migration Pressures and Immigration Policies: New Evidence on the Selection of 
Migrants 
  by Johanna Avato, December 2009 (online only) 
 
0929  Ex-Ante Methods to Assess the Impact of Social Insurance Policies on Labor 
Supply with an Application to Brazil 
  by David A. Robalino, Eduardo Zylberstajn, Helio Zylberstajn and 
Luis Eduardo Afonso, December 2009 (online only) 
 
0928 Rethinking  Survivor  Benefits 
  by Estelle James, December 2009 (online only) 
 
0927  How Much Do Latin American Pension Programs Promise to Pay Back? 
  by Alvaro Forteza and Guzmán Ourens, December 2009 (online only) 
 
0926  Work Histories and Pension Entitlements in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay 
  by Alvaro Forteza, Ignacio Apella, Eduardo Fajnzylber, Carlos Grushka, Ianina 
Rossi and Graciela Sanroman, December 2009 (online only) 
 
0925 Indexing  Pensions 
by John Piggott and Renuka Sane, December 2009 (online only) 
 
0924  Towards Comprehensive Training 
  by Jean Fares and Olga Susana Puerto, November 2009 
 
0923  Pre-Employment Skills Development Strategies in the OECD 
  by Yoo Jeung Joy Nam, November 2009 
 
0922   A Review of National Training Funds 
  by Richard Johanson, November 2009 
 
0921  Pre-Employment Vocational Education and Training in Korea 
  by ChangKyun Chae and Jaeho Chung, November 2009 
 
0920  Labor Laws in Eastern European and Central Asian Countries: Minimum Norms 
and Practices 
  by Arvo Kuddo, November 2009 (online only) 
 
0919  Openness and Technological Innovation in East Asia: Have They Increased the 
Demand for Skills? 
  by Rita K. Almeida, October 2009 (online only) 
 
0918  Employment Services and Active Labor Market Programs in Eastern European 
and Central Asian Countries 
  by Arvo Kuddo, October 2009 (online only) 
 0917 Productivity  Increases  in  SMEs: With Special Emphasis on In-Service Training 
of Workers in Korea 
by Kye Woo Lee, October 2009 (online only) 
 
0916   Firing Cost and Firm Size: A Study of Sri Lanka's Severance Pay System 
by Babatunde Abidoye, Peter F. Orazem and Milan Vodopivec, September 2009 
(online only) 
 
0915  Personal Opinions about the Social Security System and Informal Employment: 
Evidence from Bulgaria 
by Valeria Perotti and Maria Laura Sánchez Puerta, September 2009 
 
0914  Building a Targeting System for Bangladesh based on Proxy Means Testing 
  by Iffath A. Sharif, August 2009 (online only) 
 
0913  Savings for Unemployment in Good or Bad Times: Options for Developing 
Countries 
  by David Robalino, Milan Vodopivec and András Bodor, August 2009 (online 
only) 
 
0912  Social Protection for Migrants from the Pacific Islands in Australia and New 
Zealand 
  by Geoff Woolford, May 2009 (online only) 
 
0911  Human Trafficking, Modern Day Slavery, and Economic Exploitation 
by Johannes Koettl, May 2009 
 
0910  Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts in Latin America: Overview and 
Assessment 
  by Ana M. Ferrer and W. Craig Riddell, June 2009 (online only) 
 
0909  Definitions, Good Practices, and Global Estimates on the Status of Social 
Protection for International Migrants 
  by Johanna Avato, Johannes Koettl, and Rachel Sabates-Wheeler, May 2009 
(online only) 
 
0908  Regional Overview of Social Protection for Non-Citizens in the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) 
by Marius Olivier, May 2009 (online only)  
 
0907 Introducing  Unemployment  Insurance to Developing Countries 
  by Milan Vodopivec, May 2009 (online only) 
 
0906  Social Protection for Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the Southern Africa 
Development Community (SADC) 
  by Mpho Makhema, April 2009 (online only) 0905  How to Make Public Works Work: A Review of the Experiences 
  by Carlo del Ninno, Kalanidhi Subbarao and Annamaria Milazzo, May 2009 
(online only) 
 
0904  Slavery and Human Trafficking: International Law and the Role of the World 
Bank 
  by María Fernanda Perez Solla, April 2009 (online only) 
 
0903  Pension Systems for the Informal Sector in Asia 
  edited by Landis MacKellar, March 2009 (online only) 
 
0902  Structural Educational Reform: Evidence from a Teacher’s Displacement 
Program in Armenia 
  by Arvo Kuddo, January 2009 (online only) 
 
0901  Non-performance of the Severance Pay Program in Slovenia 





To view Social Protection Discussion papers published prior to 2009, please visit 
www.worldbank.org/sp. Abstract
Over the last decade, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs have 
become one of the most widely adopted anti-poverty initiatives in 
the developing world. Inspired particularly by Mexico’s successful 
Progresa/Oportunidades program, CCTs are viewed as an effective 
way to provide basic income support while building childrens’ human 
capital. These programs have had a remarkable global expansion, 
from a handful programs in the late 1990s to programs in close to 
30 countries today, including a demonstration program in the United 
States. In contrast to many other safety net programs in developing 
countries, CCTs have been closely studied and well evaluated, creating 
both a strong evidence base from which to inform policy decisions and 
an active global community of practice.  
This paper first reviews the emergence of CCTs in the context of a key 
theme in welfare reform, notably using incentives to promote human 
capital development, going beyond the traditional focus on income 
support. The paper then examines what has been learned to date from 
the experience with CCTs in the South and raises a series of questions 
concerning the relevance and replicability of these lessons in other 
contexts. We then turn to the North to look at how lessons from the 
South have influenced the introduction of the first holistic CCT program 
in the North, the Opportunity New York City Family Rewards program. 
The paper concludes with a call for further knowledge sharing in two 
areas: between the North and South as the experience with welfare 
reform and CCTs in particular expands, and between behavioral 
science and welfare policy.
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